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COBRA Strikes Back:
Anatomy of a Tax Shelter
KAREN C. BURKE AND GRAYSON M.P McCOUCH*
Like sellers of treasure maps, promoters of tax shelters promise that for a
large fee one can navigate a secret route. What clinches these deals is not the
chart itself but [an opinion letter] that appears to warrant that the map is as
good as gold .... Written by tax lawyers using the embossed stationery of
their firms, the letters typically cost $50,000, $75,000 or more, and require
a signed promise to keep the contents secret, like the treasure map, lest the
Internal Revenue Service discover where untaxed fortunes lie. But... opin-
ion letters may not be worth the paper they are written on.'
I. Introduction
Paul M. Daugerdas has gained notoriety for himself and his erstwhile firm,
Jenkens & Gilchrist, as the designer of a tax shelter technique that uses con-
tingent liabilities to generate artificial tax losses on a grand scale.2 For all its
surface complexity and sophistication, the basic shelter transaction is surpris-
ingly simple in concept. In essence, it uses offsetting options to inflate the
basis of property that is distributed by a partnership and then contributed
to and sold by another partnership, resulting in a large tax loss without any
corresponding economic loss. In principle, this type of shelter could be repli-
cated indefinitely and generate unlimited tax losses. Mr. Daugerdas is by no
means unique. The transactions that he approved as shelter counsel on behalf
of Jenkens & Gilchrist differ only in trivial details from myriad other transac-
*Karen C. Burke is a Warren Distinguished Professor, University of San Diego School of
Law. Garyson M.P. McCouch is a Professor, University of San Diego School of Law. They are
grateful for superb research assistance provided by Judith Lihosit and for generous research
support from the University of San Diego School of Law.
'David Cay Johnston, Costly Questions Arise on Legal Opinions for Tax Shelters, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 9, 2003, at 25.
2 Contingent-liability shelters represent "a majority of all abusive tax-shelter cases in litiga-
tion now." Tom Herman, Tax-Shelter Users Get Some Rare Good News, WALL ST. J., June 4,
2008, at D I (quoting a Service spokesman). A tax shelter might be loosely defined as "a deal
done by very smart people that, absent tax considerations, would be very stupid." Id. (quoting
Professor Michael Graetz). See also Joseph Bankman, The New Market in Corporate Tax Shelters,
83 TAX NOTES 1775, 1777 (June 21, 1999) [hereinafter Bankman, New Market in Tax Shelters]
(describing a tax shelter as "a product whose useful life is apt to end soon after it is discovered
by the Treasury").
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tions peddled by other lawyers and accountants. 3
Contingent-liability tax shelters, however, are a highly risky business. Mr.
Daugerdas and others like him have reaped enormous rewards for themselves
and their clients, but some of the tax shelters they designed for credulous and
wealthy clients have backfired spectacularly. Congress and the Treasury have
taken remedial action to shut down abusive tax shelters, and several courts
have invoked longstanding judicial doctrines to strike down transactions that
lack economic substance and have no real business or investment purpose,
despite purported compliance with the literal terms of the tax laws. The pro-
liferation of abusive tax shelters could never have gotten off the ground with-
out the active participation of high-priced counsel-some of them at highly
reputable firms-who issued reassuring legal opinions concerning the tax
consequences of shelter transactions.4 Upon discovering that the anticipated
tax benefits failed to materialize, disgruntled clients have rushed to sue the
lawyers, accountants, investment advisers, and banks that created and mar-
keted defective shelters. Mr. Daugerdas is the target of a criminal investiga-
tion, and Jenkens & Gilchrist has been disbanded.5 And they are only the tip
of the iceberg.
This article offers a preliminary assessment of several challenges faced by
Congress, the Treasury; and the courts in dealing with contingent-liability tax
shelters. The article proceeds as follows. Part II examines the role of Daugerdas
and his firm in creating and marketing contingent-liability shelters, against
the broader background of the tax shelter industry. Part III explains the basic
structure of the offsetting option transaction and its attempt to manipulate
the partnership tax provisions-in essence, the transaction turns on a simple
3In November 2003, the Senate held committee hearings on the tax shelter industry,
focusing on "generic abusive tax shelters sold to multiple clients." REPORT OF PERMANENT
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, THE ROLE OF PROFESSIONAL FIRMs IN THE U.S. TAX SHELTER
INDUSTRY, S. REP. No. 109-54, at 1 (2005) [hereinafter TAx SHELTER INDUSTRY]. For insight-
ful discussions of the market for tax shelters, see generally Joseph Bankman, 7he Tax Shelter
Problem, 57 NAT'L TAX J. 925 (2004) [hereinafter Bankman, Tax Shelter Problem]; Bankman,
New Market in Tax Shelters, supra note 2, at 1780-82 (noting that the tax shelter industry relies
heavily on maintaining "secrecy in product design and sales" and escaping detection through
the "audit lottery").
4During the 1990s, several law firms began to compete directly in the shelter market, help-
ing to develop and market "tax products" and charging fees based on the size of the expected tax
loss. See TAx SHELTER INDUSTRY, supra note 3, at 96-100 (discussing role of Brown & Wood).
Tax shelter practice has long been viewed as fundamentally different from legitimate tax plan-
ning, although the line may have become blurred. See Peter C. Canellos, A Tax Practitioner's
Perspective on Substance, Form and Business Purpose in Structuring Business Transactions and in
Tax Shelters, 54 SMU L. REv. 47, 56 (2001) ("The tax shelter professional is a different breed,
by experience, temperament, reputation, and calling.").
5See Lynnley Browning, 3 Lawyers Face Scrutiny in Tax Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2006,
at C1 [hereinafter Browning, Lawyers Face Scrutiny]; Lynnley Browning, Texas Law Firm Will
Close and Settle Tax Shelter Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2007, at C3 [hereinafter Browning,
Texas Law Firm].
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 62, No. 1
60
COBRA STRIKES BACK
question of whether (and in what amount) contingent liabilities must be
taken into account in determining the basis of an investment for tax purpos-
es.6 Part IV analyzes the contrasting rationales of two recent judicial decisions
involving defective tax shelters. Part V argues in favor of applying regulations
retroactively to shut down contingent-liability tax shelters and avoid unneces-
sary and wasteful litigation.
II. Contingent-Liability Tax Shelters
A. Background
In late 1998, Jenkens & Gilchrist, a fast-growing Texas firm, brought Mr.
Daugerdas on board as a tax partner in charge of the firm's newly-opened
Chicago office.7 Mr. Daugerdas brought with him a lucrative specialty in
tax shelters and a close working relationship with several accounting firms
(including Ernst & Young and KPMG) and the securities arm of Deutsche
Bank.8 During the next five years, Mr. Daugerdas sold at least 600 generic shel-
ters which generated hundreds of millions of dollars in fees for the firm-he
personally netted $93 million-and billions of dollars of artificial tax losses
for clients. 9 The financial incentives for crossing the line between shelter pro-
moter and shelter counsel were clearly powerful, and Mr. Daugerdas placed
himself and his firm in an ethically equivocal position by rendering favorable
6 One hallmark of tax shelters is reliance on "a literal reading of some relevant legal author-
ity" to produce artificial tax losses in a manner "inconsistent with legislative intent or purpose."
Bankman, Tax Shelter Problem, supra note 3, at 925; see also Mark P Gergen, The Common
Knowledge of Tax Abuse, 54 SMU L. REv. 131 (2001).
7 Before joining Jenkens & Gilchrist, Mr. Daugerdas was a tax partner at Altheimer & Gray,
a Chicago law firm; before that he was the head of futures and options trading in the Chicago
office of Arthur Andersen. In the late 1990s, Jenkens & Gilchrist was expanding rapidly.
Despite some concerns about Mr. Daugerdas's aggressive tax opinions and his demands for
unconventional compensation and indemnification arrangements, the firm viewed him as a
promising and "not . . . terribly risky" source of additional revenue. Nathan Koppel, Fatal
Vision: How a Bid to Boost Profits Led to a Law Firm's Demise, WALL ST. J., May 17, 2007, at Al
("That risk assessment proved catastrophically wrong."). Mr. Daugerdas's activities leading to
the collapse of Jenkens & Gilchrist have received extensive news coverage. Except as otherwise
indicated, the factual background summarized in notes 7-28 and accompanying text is drawn
from Paul Braverman, Helter Shelter, 25 AM. LAw. 65 (Dec. 2003); Brenda Sapino Jeffreys,
Bitten by a COBRA?, 19 Tix. LAw. I (Mar. 10, 2003); Sheryl Stratton, Jenkens Settlement Info
Reveals "Wealth" of Shelter Advisers, 105 TAx NOTES 273 (Oct. 18, 2004); and Koppel, supra.
8 Deutsche Bank allegedly played a major role in creating and marketing COBRA and
related tax shelters. See Lynnley Browning, Wider Look at Tax Shelters Offered by Deutsche
Bank, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2006, at C4. Deutsche Bank recently settled suits with hundreds of
shelter investors for undisclosed amounts but continues to face potential criminal charges. See
Lynnley Browning, Bank Settles Shelter Suits By Investors, N.Y. TIM s, Feb. 8, 2007, at C1.
9 Mr. Daugerdas created the shelters and issued opinion letters. For each opinion letter,
Jenkens & Gilchrist charged the client a fee equal to thret percent of the expected tax losses.
Ernst & Young's role was to target clients and market the shelters; Ernst & Young charged an
additional fee equal to 1.5% of the expected tax losses. See Braverman, supra note 7, at 68.
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tax opinions concerning tax shelters that he helped to design and market.' °
Worse still, the shelters were highly risky. If detected, they would inevitably
be challenged by the Service and might well be held invalid in court."
The Service became aware of the scope of shelter promoters' activities in
the course of an investigation of accounting firms, and in 2002 began serving
summonses on promoters and auditing the tax returns of individual inves-
tors. One of those investors, Henry Camferdam, and his business partners
had purchased a shelter designed by Mr. Daugerdas and known as COBRA
(an acronym for "Currency Options Bring Reward Alternatives"). 12 Mr.
Camferdam soon emerged as a poster-boy for disgruntled shelter investors. 13
Appearing in 2003 before the Senate Finance Committee at a hearing on
abusive tax shelters, he recalled being approached by Ernst & Young with a
high-pressure sales pitch about "a tax strategy that could virtually eliminate
our capital gains taxes." 14 Although he received assurances that the shelter was
"completely legal," he was offered two separate tax opinions from purportedly
'
0 See Bankman, New Market in Tax Shelters, supra note 2, at 1783 ("However profitable it
is to write opinions, .- .. there is more to be made in developing and promoting the shelters.");
see also Braverman, supra note 7, at 66-67. To market shelters, promoters prepare a "selling
memorandum" which sets forth technical arguments in support of the shelter. See Canellos,
supra note 4, at 57 ("No one really believes the selling memorandum."). For purposes of pen-
alty protection, shelter investors require an opinion letter from a law firm; although purport-
edly "independent," the firm is in fact often identified by the shelter promoter as willing to
render a favorable opinion. See id. ("The firms rendering such opinions bridge the gap between
real practice and shelter practice, with inevitable adverse reputational consequences, given their
role as facilitators of often abusive transactions.").
' Disgruntled investors eventually brought a class action against Jenkens & Gilchrist, Mr.
Daugerdas, and others, claiming that the defendants knew that the tax shelters "lacked eco-
nomic substance and would be held invalid if litigated." See Denney v. Jenkens & Gilchrist,
230 F.R.D. 317, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
12In 1999, Mr. Camferdam and his three business partners paid more than $6 million in
fees-$1 million to Ernst & Young, $2 million to Jenkens & Gilchrist, $75,000 to Brown &
Wood (for a second tax opinion), and $3 million to Deutsche Bank-to avoid $14 million of
taxes on $70 million of gain from sale of their business. See Tax Shelters: Who's Buying, Who's
Selling and What's the Government Doing About It?, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance,
108th Cong. 15, 87 (2004) (statement of Henry Camferdam, Jr.) [hereinafter Who's Buying].
Following Ernst & Young's disclosure of their names and the ensuing audit, they eventually
ended up owing $14 million in taxes plus an additional $11 million in interest and penalties.
See Sheldon D. Pollack & Jay A. Soled, Tax Professionals Behaving Badly, 105 TAX NOTES 201,
205 n.31 (Oct. 11, 2004).
3Mr. Camferdarn portrayed himself as an innocent investor who "fully intended to pay the
taxes [he] owed on the gain from the sale" but was lured by his "trusted legal and tax advisors"
into "a tax savings strategy that they represented was completely legal." Who's Buying, supra
note 12, at 88. He inquired, with no apparent sense of irony, about "[wjhat can be done to
protect future taxpayers" from being placed in a similar position. Id. at 89.
14d. at 15. Mr. Camferdam was initially unaware of "the actual relationships and roles of
E&Y, Jenkens & Gilchrist, and Deutsche Bank"; specifically, Ernst & Young told him that
the shelter was "an E&Y tax strategy" and that Jenkens & Gilchrist was "an 'independent' law
firm." Id. at 88. Although Jenkens & Gilchrist collected a fee of more than $2 million for an
opinion letter, Mr. Camferdam "never talked to anyone" at the firm. Id. at 87.
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"independent" counsel as "insurance" against the risk of audit by the Service.
In addition, he was required to sign a confidentiality agreement and was not
allowed to discuss the shelter with outside counsel.15 Mr. Camferdam and
his business partners sued Jenkens & Gilchrist, Mr. Daugerdas, and others,
claiming that they had been lured into purchasing a defective tax shelter.
Despite their efforts to portray themselves as innocent investors, these clients
may find it difficult to show that they reasonably relied on legal advice con-
cerning transactions that appeared too good to be true. 16
In 2004, the government forced Jenkens & Gilchrist to turn over its cli-
ent lists and, in 2005, the firm agreed to pay $81.5 million to settle a class
action brought by more than 1,000 tax shelter investors, including Mr.
Camferdam. 17 By 2006, Mr. Daugerdas had become "the tax lawyer at the
heart of a broadening federal investigation into questionable tax shelters."' 8
In 2007, Jenkens & Gilchrist was finally forced to close its doors. As part of
a landmark settlement, the firm accepted responsibility for criminal wrong-
doing in connection with its tax shelter activities and agreed to pay a $76
'
51d. at 86-88. Ernst & Young was "in a hurry to get the deal done," and Mr. Camferdam
viewed it "as like closing a mortgage loan, where it was sign the documents or go to another
lender, except that in this case E&Y was the only party we knew of who could eliminate our
taxes, in their words, 'legally and conservatively."' Id. at 87.
'
6Mr. Camferdam admitted that from the outset "it was obvious there was no business pur-
pose for this shelter other than tax reduction. There was no risk possibility." Who's Buying, supra
note 12, at 15. In investor suits, it is often difficult to prove malpractice on the part of shelter
counsel. See Bankman, New Market in Tax Shelters, supra note 2, at 1782-83. For example,
Jenkens & Gilchrist argued that its "more likely than not" opinion was no more aggressive than
similar opinions rendered by other law and accounting firms. See Denney, 230 ER.D. at 338.
17The bulk of the settlement (more than $70 million) was paid by Jenkens & Gilchrist's
insurance carrier; Jenkens & Gilchrist itself paid $5.25 million; of the remaining $6.25 mil-
lion, Mr. Daugerdas paid around $4 million and his two tax partners from the Chicago office
paid around $1 million each. See Denney, 230 ER.D. at 324; Paul Braverman, Jenkens and
Several Liability: Can Tax Shelter Victims Pierce the Veil of a Law Firm's Corporate Structure?, 27
AM. LAw. 18 (Feb. 2005). Jenkens & Gilchrist stripped Mr. Daugerdas of his equity stake in
the firm, and in December 2005 finally terminated his contractual arrangement with the firm.
See Browning, Lawyers Face Scrutiny, supra note 5, at C1.
1SLynnley Browning, Inquiry Into Tax Shelters Widens Beyond Audit Firms, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
4, 2006, at C3; see also Lynnley Browning, Tax Inquiry Is Moving Past KPMG, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 16, 2005, at C1 (describing focus on Jenkens & Gilchrist, Ernst & Young, and Deutsche
Bank); Pollack & Soled, supra note 12, at 205 n.26 (noting that tax shelter promoters such as
Mr. Daugerdas "are denounced as 'rogue' partners by their colleagues after they are publicly
exposed, but were hailed as 'rainmakers' before they got caught").
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million penalty.'9
B. Offietting- Option Shelters
TIhe COBRA shelter purchased by Mr. Camferdam was part of a family of tax
shelters known generically as "Son of BOSS."20 T1hese transactions typically
involved a transfer to a partnership of property encumbered by contingent
liabilities, resulting in high-basis, low-value partnership interests. By ignoring
the effect of the contingent liabilities on outside basis, the shelter promoters
purported to create a large artificial capital loss that could be used to offset
unrelated capital gains. These shelters were aggressively marketed to individu-
als who had accumulated substantial wealth during the technology and stock-
market boom of the late 1990s.2
The basic concept of an offsetting-option shelter was remarkably simple. 22
A taxpayer would sell an option to acquire securities (or foreign currency)
to a bank and simultaneously buy a substantially offsetting option from the
bank. The cost of the purchased (long) option would be slightly higher than
the premium received for the sold (short) option.2 3 The taxpayer would then
contribute the long option and the liability incurred under the short option
to a partnership in exchange for a partnership interest. Upon a sale of the
19The combined effect of investor lawsuits and government investigation led to the demise
of Jenkens & Gilchrist. Between 2001 and 2007, the firm lost nearly 400 lawyers. As part of
the settlement with the government, Jenkens & Gilchrist admitted that some of its attorneys
"developed and marketed fraudulent tax shelters, with fraudulent tax opinions," referring to
the Chicago office without naming the individuals involved. Press Release, U.S. Attorney,
Southern District of N.Y., U.S. Enters Non-Prosecution Agreement with Jenkens & Gilchrist
in Connection with its Fraudulent Tax Shelter Activity (Mar. 29, 2007), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/tax/usaopress/2007ltxdvO7jenkins&gilchristnppr.pdf (quoting Jenkens &
Gilchrist statement). The government indicated that the decision not to prosecute Jenkens &
Gilchrist was based partly on "its inability to continue practicing as a law firm." Id.; see generally
Browning, Texas Law Firm, supra note 5, at C3.
2 Variants of COBRA included OPS (Option Partnership Strategy) and SOS (Short Option
Strategy). These so-called Son-of-BOSS shelters are variants of an earlier corporate tax shelter
known as BOSS (Bond and Options Sales Strategy).
21 See Bankman, Tax Shelter Problem, supra note 3, at 931 ("Many of the new purchasers
were individuals, who lacked expertise to judge shelter quality and who had once-in-a-lifetime
gains to shelter."). Some shelter investors who sought to avoid tax on their stock options later
discovered that they had made a costly mistake when they were assessed with tax on stock that
had plummeted in value. See Johnston, supra note 1, at 25 (noting one executive's lament that
he might "lose his entire fortune because all of his Sprint shares are worth millions less than
the taxes he avoided on those shares in the shelter").
22See Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255 (describing offsetting-option shelter).
23A call option entides the holder to acquire property (e.g., stock, securities, or currency)
at a specified price during a fixed term or at a fixed future date. If the value of the underlying
property on the relevant date exceeds the strike price (including the premium paid), the holder
exercises the option and realizes a profit; if the value of the underlying property is equal to or
less than the strike price, the option is worthless. 'The grantor (writer) of a call option is obli-
gated to deliver the underlying property (or any excess value over the strike price) to the holder
upon exercise. If the writer of a call option does not actually own the underlying property (a
"naked" option), the writer's risk of loss is essentially the same as that of a short seller.
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partnership interest, either before or after the expiration of the short option,
the taxpayer would report a capital loss. The tax loss was premised on the
theory that the short option was not taken into account as a liability under
section 752 due to its contingent nature. Accordingly, the premium paid for
the long option would increase the taxpayer's outside basis24 but the contin-
gent liability under the short option would not be included in the amount
realized on sale of the partnership interest.25
The offsetting-option transaction was designed to produce a substantial tax
loss with no real downside economic risk and minimal cash outlay for the
taxpayer. This is the essence of the tax shelter. As long as the purchased and
sold options remained bundled together, the taxpayer's potential economic
loss and net out-of-pocket cost were limited to the spread between the two
positions-a trivial amount, since the premium received for the short option
offset most of the cost of the long option. With virtually no economic risk and
minimal cash outlay, the transaction could be tailored to create any desired
amount of loss (equal to the contingent liability that was ignored). Indeed,
the taxpayer might even claim to have a profit motive, due to the (infinitesi-
mal) chance of a large gain if the purchased option was "in the money" at the
time of exercise. Of course, any realistic possibility of such a large gain would
prompt the bank (a necessary accommodation party) to demand additional
compensation.26
As a practical matter, the artificial tax loss generated by the shelter was
limited only by the amount of gain that the taxpayer wished to shelter from
tax. While there was no shortage of taxpayers willing to pay hefty fees to
promoters based on a percentage of the expected tax loss (as well as $100,000
or more to outside counsel for a tax opinion 27), there was also fierce com-
24
"Ourside basis" refers to a partner's basis in a partnership interest; "inside basis" refers to a
partnership's basis in partnership assets.25 Likewise, outside basis would not be decreased to reflect relief of the contingent liability
on expiration of the short option prior to sale of the partnership interest.26 1n some cases, it is not clear whether the banks involved in tax shelters actually carried
out the purported financial transactions. See Lynnley Browning, Deutsche Bank Said to Seek
Settlement on Tax Shelters, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2006, at C3 ("With Deutsche Bank, a lack of
documents would raise questions about whether the transactions were ever executed at all.");
Lynnley Browning, Bank Settles Shelter Suits By Investors, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2007, at CI (not-
ing allegations that shelters "typically involved fake loans and fake trades to generate artificial
losses").
27Tax opinions were an important "marketing tool" because they purported to provide
insurance against penalties in the event the shelter ultimately proved defective. TAX SHELTER
INDUSTRY, supra note 3, at 45. While the protection of a "more likely than not" opinion was
subject to various limitations (e.g., if it relied on factual assumptions that the taxpayer did not
reasonably believe were accurate, or if the transaction lacked a significant business purpose),
such an opinion was widely perceived as shielding a taxpayer from the 20% substantial-under-
statement penalty (as well as stiffer civil and criminal penalties). See Bankman, New Market in
Tax Shelters, supra note 2, at 1778-79.
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petition among designers and promoters for tax shelter business. 2 Shelter
counsel maintained that each mutation of the basis-shift transaction could
be distinguished from the others if it employed a slightly different financial
instrument or legal rationale to achieve an artificial tax loss. Thus, the ability
to draw minute, highly technical, formalistic distinctions between function-
ally equivalent transactions commanded a high premium in the tax shelter
industry
C. Response of Courts, Congress, and the Treasury
The judicial doctrines of economic substance and business purpose pose a
formidable obstacle for tax shelter proponents. These doctrines allow courts
to disregard or recharacterize a transaction that lacks a business or invest-
ment purpose (other than to generate artificial tax losses) and that has no real
effect on a taxpayer's economic situation.29 When basis-shift shelters began
to proliferate on a large scale in the late 1990s, it was not clear whether these
judicial doctrines would prove sufficiently robust to withstand the proclivity
of some courts for hyper-literalism in interpreting tax statutes. 30 At the same
time, the emergence of antipathy toward taxes and mistrust of the Service
as a powerful political movement contributed to a widespread acceptance of
tax avoidance as a legitimate pursuit. Unsurprisingly, shelter counsel and tax
litigators made the most of this apparent shift in judicial and public attitudes
and redoubled their efforts to discover and exploit perceived gaps and ambi-
2 8For example, in 2000, Mr. Daugerdas was sued by his former business partner, James
Haber of Diversified Group Inc., who accused Mr. Daugerdas of selling tax shelters without
sharing the profits pursuant to an agreement with Diversified; the suit was eventually settled.
See Braverman, supra note 7, at 65 (noting that Mr. Daugerdas described the offsetting-option
transaction as "based on a nonproprietary strategy that anyone familiar with the tax code could
figure out"). Although promoters sought to limit misappropriation by imposing confidential-
ity requirements, "leakage" about shelters ensured "some limited competition, with more than
one promoter offering identical or at least similar shelters." Bankman, New Market in Tax
Shelters, supra note 2, at 1781.
29See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); ACM Partnership v. Commissioner,
157 F3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1017 (1999). In applying these doctrines,
courts are not always clear about how the relevant transaction should be defined or what kind
or level of business purpose is required. See Bankman, Tax Shelter Problem, supra note 3, at
928 ("The economic substance doctrine is a blunt instrument that works best on the most
egregious shelters.").
3 For example, in a case involving a contingent-liability transaction, one judge mused that
the economic substance doctrine might be constitutionally suspect on separation-of-powers
grounds. See Coltec Industries, Inc. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 716, 756 (2004), vacated and
remanded, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1206 (2007) (Susan Braden,
J.) ("[W]here a taxpayer has satisfied all statutory requirements established by Congress, as
Coltec did in this case, the use of the 'economic substance' doctrine to trump 'mere compli-
ance with the Code' would violate the separation of powers."); cf Marvin A. Chirelstein &
Lawrence A. Zelenak, Tax Shelters and the Search for a Silver Bullet, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1939,
1939-40 (2005) ("It is beyond doubt that such [rule] manipulations are contrary to congres-
sional intent, but that perception has not always been conclusive or even probative in the cases
that have arisen.").
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guities in the tax laws.
In 2000, in response to abusive corporate tax shelters, Congress amended
section 358 to clarify that contingent liabilities, while often difficult to value,
are indeed treated as liabilities for purposes of the corporate nonrecognition
provisions. 3' Oddly enough, prior law provided no statutory or regulatory
definition of "liabilities" as used in the corporate nonrecognition provisions
of section 358 or the analogous partnership provisions of section 752.32 In
amending section 358, Congress specifically targeted corporate transactions
that purported to accelerate or duplicate losses through assumption of contin-
gent liabilities.3 3 The amended provision shut down these shelters by requir-
ing a shareholder to reduce its basis in stock of a controlled corporation to
reflect contingent obligations that otherwise would not be taken into account
under the basis provisions.34
In Notice 2000-44, the government signaled its intent to shut down con-
tingent-liability shelters involving partnerships.35 In amending the corporate
tax provisions of section 358, Congress directed the Treasury to promulgate
rules providing "appropriate adjustments" under Subchapter K to prevent
"acceleration or duplication of losses" through assumption of liabilities in
transactions involving partnerships," and specifically authorized the new
3See Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554 (Appendix G),
309(d)(1), 114 Stat. 2763A-587, 2763A-638 (2001) (adding section 358(h)).
32 Section 358(h)(3) now defines the term "liability" to include "any fixed or contingent
obligation to make payment," without regard to whether the obligation constitutes a liability
under any other provision of the Code. See id. (effective for assumptions of liability after
Oct. 18, 1999); STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAx'N, io6TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX
LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 106TH CONGRESS 153-56 (Comm. Print 2001).
33The contingent-liability shelter used by Black & Decker Corp. (B&D) was a prototypical
transaction targeted by section 358(h). See Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 E3d
431, 432-35 (4th Cit. 2006). In essence, B&D transferred $561 million cash to a subsidiary
in exchange for preferred stock worth $1 million plus assumption by the subsidiary of B&D's
contingent employee and healthcare obligations ($560 million estimated present value). B&D
claimed a basis of $561 million in the preferred stock (equal to the cash contribution), ignor-
ing the offsetting contingent obligation, and reported a $560 million loss on sale of the stock
to an accommodation party for $1 million. Under section 358(h), B&D would have been
required to reduce the basis of the preferred stock to $1 million ($561 million less $560 mil-
lion contingent obligation), eliminating the built-in $560 million loss on sale of the stock.
34Section 358(h)(1), when applicable, requires that a shareholder's basis in stock of a con-
trolled corporation be reduced (but not below fair market value) if the basis of the stock would
otherwise exceed its fair market value because an assumed liability does not give rise to a
basis reduction under section 358(d), the corporate analogue of section 752(b)- As in Black &-
Decker, such contingent liabilities represent the estimated present value of future expenses that
have not yet generated any tax basis or other tax benefit.
35Notice 2000-44 identified two transactions as abusive: the so-called "premium loan"
transaction and the offsetting-option transaction. See Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255. Like
the corporate tax shelter identified in Notice 1999-59, 1999-2 C.B. 761, these transactions
involved aggressive interpretations of the term "liability." Notice 2000-44 warned that partici-
pants in these transactions, as well as those involved in promoting or reporting them, might be
subject to appropriate penalties. The Notice also warned that willful concealment of gains and
losses through improper netting might give rise to criminal liability.
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rules to be applied with retroactive effect to October 19, 1999.36 The Treasury
interpreted this directive as authorizing rules similar to those of section 358(h)
for liabilities assumed by partnerships and, accordingly, in 2003 promulgated
Temporary Regulation section 1.752-6, which by its terms applies to certain
liabilities assumed by partnerships after October 18, 1999. 37 Under the ret-
roactive regulations, the contingent-liability transactions described in Notice
2000-44 no longer produce the desired tax loss because outside basis must
be reduced (but not below fair market value) to reflect the assumption of
the contingent liability. The retroactive regulations require a basis reduction
only to the extent that the contingent liability was not previously taken into
account for purposes of section 752.
Section 358(h) operates essentially as a buttress to the judicial doctrine
of economic substance. In Coltec Industries, Inc. v. United States, the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the assumption of contingent
asbestos liabilities by a corporate shell subsidiary "had no meaningful eco-
nomic purpose, save the tax benefits to Coltec."38 The court focused on the
lack of any business purpose for the transfer and assumption of liabilities that
produced an artificial tax loss. Having properly identified the transaction in
question, the court had little difficulty in seeing that any purported business
purpose was either mere window-dressing or could have been accomplished
without the transfer and assumption of liabilities that purportedly generated
tax benefits. 39 -he court also held that contingent obligations were liabilities
for purposes of section 358 (prior to the enactment of section 358(h)), relying
on case law dating back to 1946 concerning the sale of a business.40 Shortly
"
6See Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554 (Appendix G),
309(c)(1), 114 Stat. 2763A-587, 2763A-638 (2001) (authorizing regulations); id. § 309(d)
(2) (authorizing retroactive effect).
37See T.D. 9062, 2003-2 C.B. 46 (temporary regulations applicable to partnership's assump-
tion of partner's liabilities occurring after October 18, 1999 and before June 24, 2003); see also
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, REG-106736-00, 2003-2 C.B. 60 (proposed regulations
applicable to assumption of liabilities occurring on or after June .24, 2003). The regulations
were promulgated in final form in 2005. SeeT.D. 9207, 2005-1 C.B. 1344. Under the final
regulations, the amount of a section 752 liability is equal to the amount of the associated basis
increase (or other tax benefit). See Reg. § 1.752-1(a)(4 ).
38Coltec Industries, Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert.
denied, 549 U.S. 1206 (2007); see id. at 1351-54 (describing the lower court's rejection of the
economic substance doctrine on constitutional grounds as "untenable," and noting that the
lower court "failed to follow binding precedent of the Supreme Court and this court"). The
court viewed the economic substance doctrine as "merely a judicial tool for effectuating the
underlying Congressional purpose that, despite literal compliance with the statute, tax benefits
not be afforded based on transactions lacking in economic substance." Id at 1354.
3 9See id. at 1357-60.
4 )See id. at 1347 ("It is widely recognized that when one party in an exchange assumes a
contingent liability of another party, that contingent liability, like all other liabilities, forms an
integral part of the purchase price in the exchange."); see also Black & Decker Corp. v. United
States, 436 F.3d 431, 437-38 (4th Cir. 2006) (concluding that contingent liabilities were
liabilities under sections 357 and 358 prior to enactment of section 358(h)).
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after the decision in Coltec, the government reached a settlement in another
high-profile corporate contingent-liability shelter case, in which the taxpayer
apparently agreed to pay a portion of the taxes owed without penalties.4'
In the partnership area as well, contingent-liability shelters have given
courts an opportunity to address the tension between literal compliance with
the Code and the economic substance doctrine.42 As one court noted, how-
ever, taxpayers may perceive the tension differently, arguing that "the eco-
nomic substance doctrine cannot ignore 'deliberately adopted rules of law',
in particular, [a Tax Court decision holding] that contingent liabilities do
not constitute section 752 liabilities for purposes of calculating a partner's
basis." 43 While the government may have a strong argument that contingent-
liability transactions should fail under existing law based on extant revenue
rulings and other authority, there is clearly a risk that a court might not be
persuaded by (or might fail to grasp) the specialized definition of a liability
for purposes of section 752.44 Although section 358(h) resolved this issue pro-
spectively in the corporate area by defining liabilities broadly to include both
fixed and contingent obligations, the perceived need for a statutory amend-
ment might suggest that contingent liabilities could be ignored under prior
law.45 Moreover, in extending a similar rule to the partnership area through
retroactive regulations, the government left itself open to claims of unfairness
and overreaching by disappointed taxpayers.
111. The Cemco Transaction
A. 7The Transaction
In December 2000, Mr. Daugerdas designed a tax shelter for himself and a
client, Steven Kaplan, using a variation of the basic COBRA transaction.46
4
' See Black 6- Decker Announces Settlement in Litigation Over Outstanding Income Taxes,
2007 TAx NOTES TODAY 243-28 (Dec. 18, 2007).
42See e.g., Jade Trading, LLC v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 11, 13-14 (2007). The court
postponed its decision in Jade Trading pending release of the appellate decision in Coltec con-
cerning the viability of the economic substance doctrine.43Id. at 13.
44See infta notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
4 5Cf Coltec Industries, Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1348 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2006),
cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1206 (2007) (finding section 358(h) "of little utility" in determining
whether contingent liabilities were taken into account under prior law).46 Mr. Kaplan contributed all the cash but received only a 37.5% beneficial interest in Trust;
Mr. Daugerdas received the remaining 62.5% interest. After the Service audited the taxpay-
ers and assessed penalties, Mr. Kaplan sued Mr. Daugerdas, claiming that Mr. Daugerdas had
absconded with investment funds. According to Mr. Kaplan, Mr. Daugerdas portrayed Cemco
(an acronym for "Clean Energy Management Company") as "a profit-making partnership"
that would invest in third-world energy projects "under the auspices of the United Nations."
Appended to a "private placement memorandum" was a copy of the Kyoto Protocol to the U.N.
Framework Conventions on Climate Change along with a document entitled "Mandate to the
Solar Commission." See Complaint of Plaintiff at 4-5, Kaplan v. Daugerdas, No. 06CH04719
(Cook County, Ill. Cir. Ct., filed Mar. 9, 2006).
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The transaction proceeded as follows. Acting through a grantor trust (Trust),47
Messrs. Daugerdas and Kaplan purchased a "long" option and simultaneously
sold an offsetting "short" option, with Deutsche Bank (Bank) as the counter-
party on both options. The investors' net out-of-pocket outlay for the options
was only $6,000, the difference between the $3.6 million premium paid to
Bank for the long option and the slightly lower premium received from Bank
for the short option.48 Trust contributed both options and $50,000 addi-
tional cash to a general partnership (Partnership),49 which used the cash to
purchase euros. After the options terminated, Partnership liquidated and dis-
tributed the euros to Trust, which took the euros with a substituted basis of
$3.65 million (equal to Trust's basis in its partnership interest). Trust then
contributed the high-basis euros to another partnership (Cemco), which sold
the euros for their $50,000 market value and realized a loss of $3.6 million.5 0
The entire transaction took place within a four-week period and was under-
taken for the purpose of generating an artificial tax loss of $3.6 million for
Messrs. Daugerdas and Kaplan.
B. Tax Consequences
If Messrs. Daugerdas and Kaplan had directly purchased and sold the offset-
ting options as individuals, they would have realized a gain of nearly $3.6
million on termination of the sold option and a $3.6 million loss on the
termination of the purchased option, resulting in a net loss of only $6,000.51
For tax purposes, an option is generally treated as an open transaction as long
as the option remains outstanding and unexercised.5 2 Specifically, an option
writer does not include the premium received on sale of the option in income
until the option expires; only then does the option writer become entitled to
keep the premium with no further obligation to deliver the underlying prop-
47A grantor trust is transparent for federal income tax purposes, and each separate item of
the trust's gains and losses is reportable directly on the grantor's income tax return. See Notice
2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255 (warning against use of grantor trusts to conceal gains and losses in
contingent-liability transactions).
48The spread between the two option premiums was $36,000, which Trust initially paid to
Bank; however, Bank refunded $30,000 to Trust upon termination of the options two weeks
later.49The only partners of Partnership were Trust and Mr. Daugerdas's wholly-owned shell cor-
poration (a disregarded entity for federal income tax purposes).
5
°
0 When Cemco sold the euros, it reported a net ordinary loss of $3.6 million from disposi-
tion of nonfunctional currency. See I.R.C. § 988. Apparently, Mr. Daugerdas believed that he
could use his tax shelter to avoid tax on the income he earned from selling the same shelter to
others.51See I.R.C. § 1234(a)(1), (a)(2). Under section 1234(b)(1), the grantor's gain or loss from
any "closing transaction" is treated as a short-term capital gain or loss; a closing transaction
is "any termination of the taxpayer's obligation under an option ... other than through the
exercise or lapse of the option." See I.R.C. § 1234(b)(1), (b)(2).
52See Rev. Rul. 1978-182, 1978-1 C.B. 265. Open transaction treatment can be traced back
to Virginia Iron Coal & Coke Co. v. Commissioner, 37 B.TA. 195 (1938), ad, 99 E2d 919
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 630 (1939).
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erty to the option holder. Likewise, an option holder may not claim a loss for
the premium paid to purchase an option until the option expires; only then
does the option become worthless.
The rule allowing an option writer to defer inclusion of the option pre-
mium in income could also be explained by viewing the option writer's con-
tingent obligation under the option as an obligation to repay a loan, which
would clearly be taken into account as a liability for income tax purposes.
Under Crane principles, the option writer could postpone including the pre-
mium in income as long as the obligation remained outstanding, and the
expiration of an unexercised option could be viewed as analogous to cancel-
lation of indebtedness under section 61." Apart from the character of gain or
loss, the overall tax consequences to the option writer are generally the same,
under either an open-transaction or an offsetting-liability analysis. 54 For tax
purposes, what should matter is whether incurring the obligation generated
basis or other tax benefits. 55
To transmute a real $6,000 economic loss into an artificial $3.6 million
tax loss, the taxpayers in Cemco interposed Partnership to exploit potential
disparities between inside and outside basis. According to Mr. Daugerdas,
the tax consequences of the transaction were as follows. Trust's initial outside
basis in its Partnership interest, ignoring the contingent obligation under the
short option (as well as the spread between the option premiums) was $3.65
million, equal to the cost of the long option and the additional $50,000 con-
tributed to Partnership. According to Mr. Daugerdas, the contingent obliga-
tion of nearly $3.6 million under the short option had no effect on outside
53See Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947). If a call option is exercised, the option
premium is "repaid" by the option writer's delivery of the underlying property to the option
holder, by analogy to a debtor's repayment of borrowed funds by transferring property other
than cash.
54For purposes of sections 357, 358, and 752, there may be no "meaningful difference"
between a call option and an obligation to repay a loan. See Monte A. Jackel & Jerred G.
Blanchard, Jr., Reflections on Liabilities: Extension of New Law to Partnership Formations, 91
TAx NOTES 1579, 1591 (May 28, 2001); id. at 1590-91 (rejecting notion that a call option is
too uncertain to constitute a section 752 liability because of the built-in feature that allows the
optionee to forgive the obligation by not exercising the call). Other commentators have also
recognized the similarity between an option and a loan. See Noel B. Cunningham & Deborah
H. Schenk, Taxation Without Realization: A "Revolutionary" Approach to Ownership, 47 TAx
L. REV. 725, 781 (1992) (noting that option can be viewed as "a loan without stated inter-
est"); Bruce Kayle, Realization Without Taxation? The Not-So-Clear Reflection oflncome from an
Option to Acquire Property, 48 TAX L. REv. 233, 251 (1993) (noting "time value of money ele-
ment" and presumed equality in value of grantor's obligation and premium at time of grant).
5See Rev. Rul. 1988-77, 1988-2 C.B. 128; cf Helmer v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH)
727, T.C.M. (P-H) S 750,160 (1975) (holding receipt of option payments did not give rise
to section 752 liability or increase outside basis because there was no obligation to repay or
perform future services). Helmer was arguably distinguishable from Rev. Rul. 73-301, which
involved deferral of income attributable to the taxpayer's accounting method. See Rev. Rul.
1973-301, 1973-2 C.B. 215 (treating progress payments as "unrealized receivables" within the
meaning of section 751 (c)).
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basis because it was not treated as a liability under section 752.56 When the
options terminated, Partnership realized a gain of nearly $3.6 million (equal
to the premium received for the short option) and an offsetting loss of $3.6
million (equal to the premium paid for the worthless long option). Crucially,
Mr. Daugerdas argued that the termination of the contingent obligation
under the short option had no effect on Trust's outside basis, which remained
$3.65 million. Upon liquidation of Partnership, Trust received the euros with
a substituted basis of $3.65 million under section 732. 'The basis of the euros
remained unchanged in Cemco's hands under section 723 and generated a
$3.6 million ordinary loss for Messrs. Daugerdas and Kaplan when Cemco
sold the euros. 57
Since the basis of the euros in Cemco's hands was derived from Trust's out-
side basis in its Partnership interest, a key issue is whether Trust was entitled
to ignore the contingent obligation under the sold option in calculating out-
side basis. Even in 2000, the government could reasonably argue that the
contingent obligation should have the same effect on outside basis as other
liabilities under section 752. Under section 752(b), a reduction of a part-
ner's share of partnership liabilities produces a corresponding reduction in the
partner's outside basis; in mechanical terms, relief of liabilities is treated as a
deemed distribution of cash. Under this view, the termination of the short
option should have given rise to a deemed distribution of nearly $3.6 million,
reducing Trust's outside basis by the same amount and leaving Trust with a
basis of only $50,000 in the distributed euros (equal to their pre-distribution
basis in Partnership's hands).
The rationale for reducing Trust's outside basis by the amount of the ter-
minated contingent liability is reflected in Revenue Ruling 1988-77, which
treats an obligation as a section 752 liability to the extent it gives rise to basis
(i.e., the premium received by Trust on sale of the short option). 58 The ruling
thus reflects the conceptual equivalence between a liability's "tax amount"
56Even if the obligation under the short option were treated as a liability, there would be no
net change in Trust's initial outside basis, assuming Trust remained obligated to perform under
the short option. Under section 752, liabilities assumed and relieved must be netted against
each other; in the absence of a net shift of liabilities, Trust would still have an initial outside
basis of $3.6 million. See Reg. § 1.752-1(f).
57Messrs. Daugerdas and Kaplan could have realized a $3.6 million capital loss if Trust had
sold its partnership interest either before or after the options terminated. The liquidation of
Partnership, however, allowed Trust to receive the euros with a basis of $3.65 million and real-
ize an ordinary loss on the sale of the euros.
58See Rev. Rul. 1988-77, 1988-2 C.B. 128. The Service issued the ruling in response to a
1984 Congressional directive to harmonize the treatment of accounts payable of cash-method
taxpayers for purposes of sections 752 and 357. See H.R_ CONF. REP,. No. 98-861, at 856-57
(1984) (disapproving Rev. Rul. 1960-345, 1960-2 C.B. 211). In relevant part, the ruling
defines "partnership liabilities" for purposes of section 752 to include "an obligation only if
and to the extent that incurring the liability creates or increases the basis to the partnership of
any of the partnership's assets (including cash attributable to borrowings)." Thus, the ruling
provided a policy-based definition of liabilities for purposes of section 752, but left the term
"obligation" undefined.
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and the basis of assets, 59 and maintains symmetry between inside and out-
side basis. 60 The policy-based definition of section 752 liabilities has been
reaffirmed in subsequent rulings and was eventually embodied in final reg-
ulations promulgated in 2005.61 The regulations put to rest the purported
"conflict between the plain meaning and the policy-driven definitions" of the
term liability that fueled abusive transactions intended to duplicate or accel-
erate losses by inflating basis.62
In Cemco, the tax amount of the contingent obligation under the short
option was nearly $3.6 million, equal to the premium received from Bank on
sale of the option. Failure to reduce Trust's outside basis to reflect relief of the
contingent obligation would give rise to double-counting of the basis gener-
ated by the obligation. An alternative way to reach the same result would be
to view the premiums on the pair of options as a circular flow of funds, in
which Trust paid $3.6 million to Bank for the long option and received nearly
the entire purchase price (except for the net out-of-pocket cost of $6,000)
from Bank on the sale of the offsetting short option. When the short option
terminated, the relief of the contingent obligation could be viewed as a pur-
chase-price reduction, which should reduce the basis of the long option to
59The ruling departs from the conventional definition of a liability because it focuses on
the amount taken into account for tax purposes, which may differ from the principal or face
amount. This concept of liabilities may be interpreted broadly to encompass obligations that
fall outside the narrow definition of a liability as an obligation to pay a sum certain or per-
form future services. See WILLIAM S. MCKEE ET AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND
PARTNERS, 7.03[2], at 7-16 (4th ed. 2007). Compare Jackel & Blanchard, supra note 54, at
1588 (broad definition of liability) with Bruce Lemons et al., The New Definition of"Liability"
and Its Effect on Prepaid Forward Contracts, 100 TAX NOTES 1307, 1315 (Sept. 8, 2003) (nar-
row definition of liability).
6°Symmetrical treatment is necessary to preserve equality of inside and outside basis, consis-
tent with the principle that a borrowing transaction does not generate income because of the
offsetting repayment obligation.
61See T.D. 9207, 2005-1 C.B. 1344; Rev. Rul. 1995-26, 1995-1 C.B. 131; Rev. Rul.
1995-45, 1995-1 C.B. 53. The definition also appeared in temporary regulations promul-
gated in 1988 but was later omitted from the final version of those regulations "in response to
comments that the definition was redundant and therefore unnecessary." Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, REG-106736-00, 2003-2 C.B. 60, 62. The final regulations expressly adopt a
broad definition of liabilities for purposes of section 752. See Reg. § 1.752-1 (a)(4) (defining
section 752 liability to include any "fixed or contingent obligation" that creates or increases
basis). The final regulations clarify that obligations, whether fixed or contingent, are taken
into account without regard to whether those obligations constitute liabilities under any other
provision of the Code. See id.
6 2 WILLLAM S. McKEE ET AL., supra note 59, 7.03[3], at 7-19. The preamble acknowledges
that "[t]he definition of a liability contained in these proposed regulations does not follow
Helmer." Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, REG- 106736-00, 2003-2 C.B. 60, 62. Under one
literalist view, the 2005 regulations may be constitutionally infirm because Treasury lacks the
authority to expand the definition of liabilities. See Lemons et al., supra note 59, at 1314 ("The
argument against a broad definition of the term 'liability' is simple-it is Congress's responsi-
bility to determine tax policy. It is not within the courts' or the Service's province to disregard
the plain meaning of a word to prevent or encourage a benefit to taxpayers.").
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$6,000.63 Under this view, Trust's outside basis should have been limited to
$56,000 ($6,000 net out-of-pocket cost plus $50,000 additional cash contri-
bution), and then reduced to $50,000 to reflect a $6,000 loss on termination
of the long option. As a matter of policy, it makes no sense to allow a taxpayer
to conjure $3.6 million of outside basis from thin air and transfer that basis
to other property worth $50,000 in order to realize an artificial loss of $3.6
million.
Mr. Daugerdas had latched onto (or perhaps stumbled into) a form of
"pure" tax arbitrage. Pure tax arbitrage occurs when a taxpayer "buys and sells
for borrows and lends] the same asset." 4 In theory, tax losses of any desired
magnitude could be "reaped indefinitely" in the absence of "tax law impedi-
ments," since there were no real assets on which the pre-tax return would be
driven down by market demand.65 Indeed, pure tax arbitrage is the engine
that fueled the rapid growth of contingent-liability shelters and prompted the
government to shut them down. Although Congress eventually responded
by enacting section 358(h) in 2000, arguably no statutory amendment was
needed because the transactions were already vulnerable to attack under exist-
ing law on the ground that they lacked economic substance and served no
purpose other than to reduce taxes.66
Even if this conclusion were not obvious based on the doctrine of eco-
nomic substance, the offsetting option scheme concocted by Mr. Daugerdas
was clearly vulnerable to challenge under the section 701 partnership anti-
abuse regulations. If Partnership was ignored, the $3.6 million artificial loss
would evaporate. Yet another line of attack was opened by the retroactive
section 752 regulations promulgated in 2003. If the government could show
that those regulations applied to Mr. Daugerdas's transaction, there would be
no need to litigate the issue of economic substance.
IV. Judicial Response
A. Cemco
In Cemco, the taxpayers made little or no attempt to defend Mr. Daugerdas's
contingent-liability shelter on the merits. Instead, they staked their entire
case on a procedural technicality, arguing that the government issued its
notice of "final partnership administrative adjustment" (FPAA) to the wrong
party. Specifically, they claimed that the government was barred from chal-
lenging the artificially-enhanced basis of the euros in Cemco's hands because
6 3 See I.RC. § 108(e).
64 Daniel N. Shaviro, The Story of Knetsch: Judicial Doctrines Combating Tax Avoidance, in
TAx STORIES: AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT TEN LEADING FEDERAL INCOME TAX CAsEs 313, 319
(Paul L. Caron ed., 2003) (quoting C. Eugene Steuerle).
6 5 Id.
6Except for the interpolation of a partnership, the transaction would not have produced
an artificial loss of $3.6 million but rather a real economic loss of $6,000. In effect, Messrs.
Daugerdas and Kaplan might just as easily have burned 6,000 one-dollar bills.
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it failed to challenge Partnership's return in a timely manner. The district
court properly rejected this procedural argument, noting that it misapplied
the statutory scheme of unified partnership audit and litigation procedures
and ignored Cemco's duty to make a correct determination of the basis of
the euros contributed by Trust (rather than merely accept whatever fanciful
basis Trust might claim).67 The court then granted summary judgment for the
government and disallowed the artificial loss of nearly $3.6 million under the
retroactive section 752 regulations; the court also assessed a penalty for gross
valuation misstatement.6"
Because the taxpayers in Cemco failed to contest the validity of the retroac-
tive regulations, the court treated them as having conceded the issue.69 As a
practical matter, that concession made it unnecessary to determine whether
the contingent obligation under the short option actually constituted a sec-
tion 752 liability. If the obligation were treated as a section 752 liability, in
accordance with Revenue Ruling 1988-77, Trust would be required to reduce
its outside basis in Partnership by the amount of the liability, thereby prevent-
ing Trust and Cemco from obtaining an artificially-enhanced basis in the euros
or realizing a $3.6 million loss on the sale of the euros. On the other hand, if
the contingent obligation did not constitute a section 752 liability, the retro-
active regulations would clearly apply to the offsetting-option transaction and
produce the same end result. Accordingly, as a matter of litigation strategy,
the government had no incentive to clarify the definition of section 752 lia-
bilities for pre-2003 transactions or to challenge the taxpayers' assertion that
the contingent obligation in Cemco was technically not a section 752 liability,
especially since the prospective regulations unequivocally resolved the issue
by restating Revenue Ruling 1988-77's policy-based definition of section 752
liabilities for transactions occurring after June 23, 2003.7
The court accepted the taxpayers' view, relying on the Tax Court's 1975
memorandum decision in Helmer v. Commissioner for the proposition that
"a contingent obligation, such as a short or sold option, is not a liability
6 7 See I.R.C. §§ 6221-31, 6233-34. Section 6222 requires partnerships and partners to treat
partnership items of the partnership consistently. However, the Service was not required to
treat Cemco and Partnership identically merely because they had overlapping partners.
6"See Cemco Investors, LLC v. United States, 2007-1 U.S.T.C. 50,385, 99 A.ET.R.2d
1882 (N.D. 111. 2007).
69
-his appears to have been a calculated tactical risk. Cf. RJT Invs. X v. Commissioner,
491 F.3d 732 (8th Cir. 2007) (upholding deficiency and penalties in Son-of-BOSS case based
on finding that partnership was a "sham, lacked economic substance and was formed and/or
availed of to overstate. . . basis").
70See Reg. § 1.752-1(a)(4). To remove any possible doubt about the expansive scope of
"'obligations," the regulations provide a nonexclusive list of illustrations, including "obligations
under derivative financial instruments such as options, forward contracts, futures contracts,
and swaps." See Reg. § 1.752-1(a)(4)(ii).
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under section 752."17 In Helmer, a partnership wrote an option in the ordi-
nary course of business and then made cash distributions (from the option
premium) to its partners. The partners argued that their outside bases should
be increased by their shares of the contingent obligation, but the Tax Court
disagreed and held that the distributions were taxable.72 It is far from clear
that Helmer was correctly decided or, more importantly, that the decision
carried the persuasive power attributed to it by the taxpayers in Cemco. 73
Unlike the tax shelter in Cemco, the distributions in Helmer did not involve
the creation of artificial losses through transactions lacking in economic sub-
stance. Thus, while the Cemco court's statements about Helmer are pure dicta,
it seems unduly simplistic to suggest that "[u] ntil recently, the law respecting
whether an option contract should be treated as a liability under section 752
actually supported" the taxpayers' position.74 In portraying Notice 2000-44
as an abrupt "revers[al of the government's] position regarding partnership
liabilities under section 752,"75 the Cemco court failed to mention the series
of revenue rulings going back to 1988 in which the Service took the posi-
tion that obligations giving rise to basis were section 752 liabilities. In pro-
mulgating proposed regulations under section 752 in 2003, Treasury clearly
acknowledged its refusal to follow Helmer but expressed no view concerning
the technical definition of section 752 liabilities for transactions occurring
before June 24, 2003.76
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's grant of sum-
mary judgment for the government. Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge
Easterbrook was plainly skeptical of a transaction that involved "an out-of-
71 Cemco, 2007-1 U.S.T.C. 1 50,385, at 87,973, 99 A.FT.R.2d at 1882 (citing Helmer v.
Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 727, T.C.M. (P-H) 5 750,160 (1975)). The court cited
several additional cases which purported to follow Helmer but were readily distinguishable
because they did not involve creation of basis or other tax benefits. See Jackel & Blanchard,
supra note 54, at 1583-92 (distinguishing other pre-2000 cases and rulings and concluding
that Helmet was the only case that could not be reconciled with the Service's policy-based
definition of liabilities).72See Helmer, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) at 731, T.C.M. (P-H) 750,160. ("The option agreement
... created no liability on the part of the partnership to repay the funds paid nor to perform
any services in the future. Therefore we hold that no liability arose under section 752 and the
partners' bases cannot be increased by such amounts.").
73In Helmer, the Tax Court recognized that it faced "a unique situation" and expressed
concern that its holding seemed inconsistent with the passthrough nature of partnerships. See
id. at 731 n.4.
74 Cemco, 2007-1 U.S.T.C. 50,385, at 87,973, 99 A.ET.R-2d at 1882 ("For many years,
the Helmet rule served as the definition of liability under section 752.... Thus, under Helmer
and its progeny, it would have been proper for [Partnership] to ignore the short, or sold, option
as a liability under section 752.").
75Id
76See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, REG-106736-00, 2003-2 C.B. 60, 62 (noting that
the definition of liabilities under the proposed regulations "does not follow Helmer'); see also
id. at 61 ("There is no statutory or regulatory definition of liabilities for purposes of section
752.").
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pocket cost of $6,000 and no risk beyond that expense, while generating a tax
loss of $3.6 million."7 7 The offsetting options were part of a single, integrated
package which was deliberately structured to eliminate virtually all invest-
ment risk. 'The proceeds that Trust received from selling the short option
almost completely offset the $3.6 million premium that it nominally paid for
the long option. Similarly, the Trust's potential payment obligation of nearly
$7.2 million under the short option almost completely offset the $7.2 million
potential payoff from the long option, except in the unlikely event that the
euro exchange rate fell within a very narrow collar at the end of the two-week
option period.78 Since both options were designed to terminate without being
exercised, the only real significance of the transaction was to establish a high
outside basis that could be assigned to the euros and ultimately used to gen-
erate an artificial tax loss of $3.6 million. As Judge Easterbrook drily noted:
"The deal as a whole seems to lack economic substance; if it has any substance
(a few thousand dollars paid to purchase a slight chance of a big payoff) then
the $3.6 million 'gain' on one premium should be paired with the $3.6 mil-
lion 'loss' on the other; and at all events the deal's nature ([$6,000] paid for
a slim chance to receive $7.2 million) is not accurately reflected by treating
E56,000 as having a basis of $3.6 million."79
In disallowing the purported $3.6 million loss, the Seventh Circuit upheld
the validity of the retroactive section 752 regulations. 'While "[r]etroactivity
requires justification," the court found it "obvious" from the terms of the reg-
ulations that they were authorized by Congress's explicit 2000 directive to the
Treasury to prescribe retroactive rules for partnerships (and S corporations)
similar to the basis-reduction rules applicable to corporations under sec-
tion 358(h).8" Having concluded that the section 752 regulations "applie[d]
to this deal and prevent[ed] Cemco's investors from claiming a loss," Judge
77 Cemco Investors, LLC v. United States, 515 F.3d 749, 751 (7th Cir. 2008).
7 Under the long (purchased) option, Bank agreed to pay Trust $7-2 million if the euro
was worth less than or equal to $0.8652 at the end of the two-week option period. Under the
short (sold) option, Trust agreed to pay Bank $7.128 million if the euro was worth less than or
equal to $0.8650 on the same date. Thus, Trust stood to gain $7.2 million only if the euro was
worth more than $0.8650 but not more than $0.8652 at the end of the two-week period. If
the euro ended up at 0.8650 or less, Trust would receive only $72,000 (the difference between
the payoffs under the two options). At the beginning of the option period, the euro was worth
around $0.8875.
As a practical matter, the possibility of a $7.2 million payoff may have been illusory. See
Stobie Creek Investments, LLC v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 636, 687 (2008) (discussing
Deutsche Bank's "practice of manually changing short and long strike prices . .. to match one
another at the request of 'traders,"' thereby "eliminating any need for an internal hedge ... for
the theoretical risk of hitting the sweet spot").
79Cemco, 515 E3d at 751.
8
°
0 d. at 752 ("Section 309 of the Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000 ... enacts
basis-reduction rules for many transactions and authorizes the IRS to adopt regulations pre-
scribing similar rules for partnerships and S corporations. Section 309(d)(2) of the 2000 Act
adds that these regulations may be retroactive to October 18, 1999. That's the power the
Commissioner used when promulgating Treas. Reg. § 1.752-6.").
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Easterbrook gave short shrift to the taxpayers' complaint of unfairness:
"Cemco is scarcely in a position to complain - not only because this tax shel-
ter was constructed after the warning in Notice 2000-44, but also because all
the regulation does is instantiate the pre-existing norm that transactions with
no economic substance don't reduce people's taxes."8 '
If Judge Easterbrook was correct in viewing the retroactive section 752 reg-
ulations as merely "instantiat[ing]" the doctrine of economic substance, one
is tempted to ask why Congress found it necessary to authorize those regula-
tions (or, indeed, to enact § 358(h)). In principle, the retroactive regulations
may seem redundant since courts could reach the same result by applying the
doctrine of economic substance (or the closely related doctrines of substance
over form, step transaction, and business purpose). As a practical matter,
however, by resting its decision squarely on the retroactive regulations, the
court avoided the need to remand the case for a full-fledged trial on the fact-
dependent issue of economic substance. As Judge Easterbrook clearly per-
ceived, "regulations that specify [the] sorts of transactions that may be looked
through" for tax purposes serve an important function of judicial economy:
they "avoid the need to litigate, one tax shelter at a time, whether any real
economic transaction is inside the box."82 Even the taxpayers conceded that
the retroactive regulations, if they were upheld, would "scupper the entire
class of offsetting-option tax shelters." 3
The retroactive section 752 regulations also allowed Judge Easterbrook
to brush aside the taxpayers' reliance on Helmer to justify an artificially-en-
hanced outside basis. "'That may or may not be the right way to understand
Helmer-, we need not decide, for it is not controlling in this court--or any-
where else."8s4 By applying the retroactive regulations, the court seems to have
tacitly accepted the taxpayers' premise that the contingent obligation under
the short option was not already taken into account under section 752. If,
contrary to the Helmer rule, an obligation actually constituted a section 752
liability, there would be no need for a remedial adjustment and the retroactive
regulations by their terms would not apply. Although the retroactive regula-
tions did not purport to define the precise scope of section 752 liabilities
under pre-2003 law, they effectively undercut Helmer as support for contin-
gent-liability tax shelters by requiring that outside basis be reduced in the
same manner for obligations that generated basis but escaped classification as
section 752 liabilities.8 5 For transactions occurring on or after June 24, 2003,
the prospective section 752 regulations directly address the issue by defining
81Id.
821d. at 751.
83 Id.
84 Id.
8 5 By analogy to section 358(h)(1) in the corporate context, the retroactive section 752 regu-
lations required outside basis to be reduced only if necessary to prevent a built-in loss (after
application of the normal section 752 rules) in the partnership interest of the partner whose
liabilities were assumed.
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section 752 liabilities to include both fixed and contingent obligations (con-
sistent with the definition of liabilities in section 358(h)(3)) to the extent they
give rise to basis.8 6
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Cemco demonstrates the utility of the
retroactive section 752 regulations for courts confronted with an impend-
ing flood of contingent-liability cases. The controversy over the Helmer rule
amounted to little more than a distraction because the Helmer-based techni-
cal arguments advanced by shelter counsel could not survive scrutiny under
the economic substance doctrine. Stated differently, shelter counsel invoked
the Helmer rule to justify rendering penalty-shield opinions while discount-
ing the contrary position of revenue rulings and Notice 2000-44 as well as the
lack of economic substance in the contingent-liability shelters.
B. Kornman
Shortly after the Seventh Circuit's decision in Cemco, the Fifth Circuit struck
down a similar contingent-liability shelter in Kornman & Associates, Inc. v.
United States.8 7 Mr. Kornman, like Mr. Daugerdas, was a lawyer who ped-
dled tax shelters to others and decided to get a piece of the action himself.
Mr. Kornman's shelter involved a short sale while Mr. Daugerdas's shelter
involved offsetting options, but both relied on the same basic tax gimmick. In
1999, acting through a trust and a couple of wholly-owned corporations, Mr.
Kornman executed a short sale ofTreasury notes with a face value of$ 100 mil-
lion.88 He then contributed the cash proceeds of the short sale (around $102
million) plus $2 million additional cash to a partnership which also assumed
the short-sale obligation, and sold the partnership interest for $1.8 million
to an employee who used the cash to close the short sale.89 All of these steps
were completed within a four-day period. Although the transaction resulted
86See Reg. § 1.752-1(a)(4); cf I.R.C. § 358(h)(3).
87527 E3d 443 (5th Cir. 2008), affgColm Producer, Inc. v. United States, 460 E Supp. 2d
713 (N.D. Tex. 2006). -he lower court believed that contingent obligations were not treated
as section 752 obligations under prior law but nevertheless disallowed the claimed loss on the
ground that the taxpayer's obligation was fixed rather than contingent. See Colrn, 460 E Supp.
2d at 715-16.
8 In a short sale, an investor borrows shares of stock (or other fungible property such as
Treasury notes) from a broker and sells them to a third party. 'The investor is obligated to close
the short sale by repaying the borrowed shares in kind (along with a fee or agreed interest) to
the broker. If the share price drops, the investor closes the short sale by purchasing identical
shares, delivers them to the broker, and pockets the difference between the (higher) sale price
and the (lower) purchase price. On the other hand, if the share price rises, the investor's risk
of loss is unlimited; there is generally no time limit on the obligation to cover. Thus, a short
sale allows the investor to profit from a drop in the share price; it is the mirror image of a stock
purchase, which allows the investor to profit from a rise in the share price.
89 1n fact, the Kornman transaction involved several additional steps which were apparently
intended to disguise the nature of the transaction. According to a lawyer who helped draft the
tax opinion, "the groundwork for the tax shelter was conceived and fully blueprinted nearly a
year before the transaction occurred," with the understanding that it would produce "a signifi-
cant tax benefit." Kornman, 527 E3d at 449.
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in a real economic loss of $200,000 ($2 million cash contribution less $1.8
million sale proceeds), the taxpayers reported a "fake" tax loss of over $102
million on the sale of the partnership interest ($104 million outside basis less
$1.8 million amount realized). 90
The Fifth Circuit clearly understood that Mr. Kornman's shelter was pre-
mised on asymmetrical treatment of the short-sale proceeds and the short-sale
obligation.9' The linchpin of the taxpayers' technical argument was that the
short-sale obligation was not a section 752 liability and therefore should be
ignored in determining the amount realized on sale of the partnership inter-
est. This argument did not impress the court, which responded by directly
confronting the issue that the Seventh Circuit had skirted in Cemco-the
treatment of contingent liabilities as section 752 liabilities under pre-20 0 3
law.
In a decision written by Judge DeMoss, the court began by observing that
in 1999 "there was no statutory definition of 'liability' for purposes of section
752, and the IRS had not formally promulgated a definition in its treasury
regulations." 92 Noting that it could not resolve the issue "simply by referring
to the definition of 'liability' in Black's Law Dictionary" and that neither
the statutory language nor the legislative history provided useful guidance,
the court turned to the policy-based definition of section 752 liabilities pro-
pounded by the Service in revenue rulings beginning with Revenue Ruling
1988-77.11 Although revenue rulings are generally not entitled to the same
degree of deference as regulations, the court gave "significant weight" to the
Service's ruling position based on "the thoroughness evident in its consider-
ation, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pro-
nouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking
power to control."94 The persuasive power of the rulings was bolstered by a
recent Tax Court memorandum decision applying the Service's definition of
90Commenting on "the elephant in the room," the court compared the taxpayers' "premedi-
tated attempt to transform this wash transaction (for economic purposes) into a windfall (for
tax purposes)" to "an alchemist's attempt to transmute lead into gold." Id. at 456.91
"If the obligation to replace the borrowed securities was a 'contingent liability' that did
not increase the amount realized on the sale, then the proceeds from the short sale should also
be treated as a 'contingent asset' that has no effect on the outside basis calculation under sec-
tion 722. The initial short sale that generates the cash proceeds and the subsequent covering
transaction are inextricably intertwined." Id. at 460-61.
921d. at 451 (footnote omitted).
93See Rev. Rul. 1988-77, 1988-2 C.B. 129; Rev. Rul. 1995-26, 1995-1 C.B. 131; Rev. RuL.
1995-45, 1995-1 C.B. 53.
9'Kornman, 527 F.3d at 455 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140
(1944)).
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section 752 liabilities in a similar short-sale transaction." Noting that the
taxpayers' position would produce an "absurd result," the court found the
Service's definition of section 752 liabilities entirely reasonable as a method
of curbing artificial basis enhancements and refused to adopt a definition that
would allow taxpayers to pursue a "conspicuous raid on the Treasury through
the use of this tax shelter. 96
'The court remained unmoved by the taxpayers' contention that the
Service's definition of section 752 liabilities contradicted "years of established
law" (including Helmer) providing that contingent liabilities should not be
taken into account in determining outside basis. Judge DeMoss brushed aside
the taxpayer's reliance on Helmer, noting that the partnership in that case
"did not receive assets giving rise to a partnership obligation."97 Applying the
Service's definition, he concluded that the short-sale obligation was a sec-
tion 752 liability with a value equal to the proceeds of the original short sale. 98
Accordingly, the tax amount of the liability was included in the amount real-
ized on the sale of the partnership interest under section 752(d), and the
taxpayers' artificial $102 million tax loss collapsed like a punctured balloon.
Although it is certainly possible to draw a technical distinction between the
short-sale transaction in Kornman and the offsetting-option transaction in
95 See Salina Partnership LP v. Commissioner, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 686,2000 T.C.M. (RIA) j
54,122. In Salina, the court distinguished Helmer and found that open-transaction treatment
of short sales mandated by section 1233 was not controlling because "sections 1233 and 752
are mutually exclusive." Salina, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) at 698-700, 2000 T.C.M. (RIA) 54,122
at 2011-12. Although the court discussed the Service's policy-based definition of liabilities
and the need to maintain equality of inside and outside basis, the decision could be viewed as
resting ultimately on a dictionary definition of liabilities. See WLLIAM S. McKEE ET AL., supra
note 59, 7.03[2], at 7-19 ("[T]he court hedged between a policy-based approach and the
historical definition of'liability[.]"'). Since traditional accounts payable of a cash-method tax-
payer clearly fall outside section 752, the court's conclusion that section 752 liabilities include
all "legally enforceable financial obligations" was clearly overly broad. See id.
9 6Kornman, 527 F.3d at 455-56 (footnote omitted).
97 1d. at 461. Other cases cited by the taxpayers were also distinguishable because they did
not involve "obligations that created or increased the basis of the partnership assets." Id. at
462.
9 8 The court accepted the Service's view, set forth in Revenue Ruling 1995-45, that "in
the case of an 'open' short sale, the amount of liability assumed for basis purposes equals the
proceeds of the original sale." Id. at 460. The court also noted that the taxpayers could not
claim that they were "unfairly surprised or prejudiced" because "they were on notice as early as
1988, and certainly by 1995, that the IRS considered the obligation to close a short sale to be
a liability under section 752." Id at 462.
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Cemco, the two transactions were functionally similar.99 As the Fifth Circuit
noted, both are variants of the same "Son-of-BOSS" basis-shifting strategy,
and the court's rationale for treating a short-sale obligation as a section 752
liability applies with equal force to an obligation under a short option.'00
In both cases, relief of a contingent liability should give rise to an amount
realized (or reduce outside basis) to the extent the same liability gave rise to
basis when it was originally incurred. In this sense, the Service's policy-based
definition of section 752 liabilities may be viewed simply as an application of
the longstanding symmetry principle of Crane and Tufts.''
If the obligations described in Notice 2000-44 (including contingent obli-
gations under short sales and short options) actually constituted section 752
liabilities, they would already have to be taken into account in determining
outside basis and there would be no need to apply the retroactive section 752
regulations. 2 Indeed, regardless of how contingent obligations are classified,
the tax shelters in Cemco, Kornman, and similar cases should be vulnerable to
attack under the partnership anti-abuse rule or the economic substance doc-
trine. 03 As a practical matter, the retroactive regulations provide a convenient
99 1n Kornman, the court noted that "none of the cases or revenue rulings cited by the [tax-
payers] involve a short sale, which we consider a unique transaction." Id. at 461. Unlike a short
sale, an option expires automatically if it is not exercised by a specified date; in addition, an
option writer's potential profit is limited to the amount of the option premium. Nevertheless,
a short seller and the writer of a naked option face essentially the same unlimited downside
exposure if the price of the underlying property rises. In Kornman, given the low-risk nature of
Treasury securities and the compressed time frame of the transaction, the purported tax savings
far outweighed any real economic risk.
10 0 1d. at 446; cf Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2006),
cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1206 (2007) (treating contingent liabilities as liabilities under analogous
provision of section 358 in corporate context).
""See Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947); Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300
(1983). In the analogous context of corporate reorganizations, Congress in 1939 enacted the
provisions now set forth in sections 357, 358, and 362 to reverse the Supreme Court's Hendler
decision which treated an assumption of liabilities as a payment of cash boot. See Stanley S.
Surrey, Assumption of Indebtedness in Tax-Free Exchanges, 50 YALE L.J. 1 (1940); Karen C.
Burke, 7he Story of Hendler: From Pyrrhic Victory to Modern Section 357, in BUSINESS TAX
STORIES 181 (Steven A. Bank & Kirk J. Stark eds., 2005)_
102 Indeed, one prominent commentator argued that the retroactive section 752 regula-
tions were unnecessary precisely because those obligations were arguably already treated
as section 752 liabilities. See Philip F. Postlewaite, Son of Boss Meets Annie Get Your Gun: A
Cautionary Tale, 6 Bus. ENTITIES 16, 19 (2004); id. at 26-27 (concluding that the "definition
of a 'liability' has remained constant" since 1988); cf id. at 27 n.28 ("[T]ax advisers may have
felt that the Helmer decision ... was more substantial authority than the [1988] proposed
regulation or the revenue rulings-").
l' 3 In 1994, several years before Mr. Daugerdas claimed to have invented the COBRA shelter,
the New York State Bar Association concluded that, despite the technical distinctions between
short sales and options, both transactions were vulnerable to recharacterization under the pro-
posed partnership anti-abuse rule of Reg. § 1.701-2. See NYSBA Tax Section, Committee on
Partnerships, Report on the Proposed Partnership Anti-Abuse Rule, 94 TAx NOTES TODAY 130-34,
Appendix, Ex. 13 (July 6, 1994) (noting that "the result would be the same" if the partnership
used offsetting options "instead of engaging in a [short sale of] government bonds").
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short-cut to reach the correct basis result while avoiding case-by-case litigation
of particular transactions. 0 4 At the same time, relying on those regulations to
curb contingent-liability shelters could ultimately prove to be a risky strategy
for the government.1 0 5 Because the retroactive regulations do not purport to
clarify the definition of section 752 liabilities under pre-2003 law, taxpay-
ers have repeatedly cited Helmer for the broad proposition that contingent
obligations could be ignored in determining outside basis under prior law.10 6
In cases like Cemco, this misleading portrayal of prior law seemed relatively
harmless because the court reached the correct result under the retroactive
regulations. In other cases, however, the potential mischief is considerably
greater. Lulled by the revisionist view of Helmer as an accurate reflection of
prior law, some courts may be tempted to view the retroactive regulations as a
dramatic change and call the validity of those regulations into question.
V. The Retroactive Section 752 Regulations
The validity of the retroactive section 752 regulations has emerged as a high-
stakes issue in litigation over contingent-liability shelters. If the regulations
are declared invalid, the government will be forced to litigate each new shelter
mutation on a case-by-case basis unless courts conclude that even under pre-
2003 law contingent obligations constituted section 752 liabilities because
they generated basis. 10 7 In challenging the regulations, taxpayers have argued
104 Cf. Kornman, 527 F.3d at 462-63 (King, J., concurring) ("The Internal Revenue Service
seeks a rule of law from a circuit court to dispose of this case .. . without being put to the
expense and delay of litigating the fact-bound question whether these transactions should
be recharacterized for tax purposes under the no-economic-substance and step-transactions
doctrines. The result is a rule of law addressing what is here a pretense, an unsettling under-
taking."). Under the final regulations, an obligation under a short sale should give rise to a
section 752 liability equal to the amount of cash proceeds from the sale. See Blake D. Rubin
& Andrea Macintosh Whiteway, New Partnership Liability Regulations Target Abuse But Sweep
More Broadly, 100 J. TAx'N 86, 88-89 (2004).
*'°See Chief Counsel Notice CC-2003-020 (June 25, 2003); Chief Counsel Notice
CC-2003-030 (Sept- 10, 2003) (discussing application of retroactive section 752 regulations
to transactions identified in Notice 2000-44); see also Goldberg Suggests Son of Boss Regs Will
Diminish Settlement Prospects, 2003 TAx NOTES TODAY 219-47 (Nov. 13, 2003) ("[Tihe IRS'
stakes in litigating the validity of its Temporary Regulation are far different from the stakes
faced by individual taxpayers.... [1] fthe IRS loses but one case on the validity of its Temporary
Regulation, the consequences from the perspective of tax administration are potentially quite
severe.").
1 P6prior to enactment of section 358(h), Treasury officials apparently considered the pos-
sibility of expressly repudiating Helmer but decided not to do so, presumably because of con-
cerns about a potential whipsaw. See Jade Trading, LLC v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 11, 44
n.65 (2007) (referring to internal Service memorandum which was inadvertently disclosed in
other litigation).
'
07Failure by the government to litigate pending cases would provide a windfall for hun-
dreds of shelter investors who refused the opportunity to settle by paying taxes in exchange
for reduced penalties and partial deduction of transaction costs. See Announcement 2004-46,
2004-21 I.R.B. 964 (announcing setdement initiative); see also Lee A. Sheppard, Two Minutes
to Midnight: Settle Your Tax Shelter Case, 110 TAX NOTES 812 (Feb. 16, 2006).
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that the government exceeded its authority under the Congressional directive
in section 309 of the Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000 (CRTRA)
and that the retroactive regulations unfairly attempt to disallow losses that
would have been allowable under pre-2003 law.'0 8 The regulations were
published in temporary form on June 24, 2003, which marks the watershed
between the retroactive rules of Regulation section 1.752-6 (applicable to
assumptions of liabilities occurring after October 18, 1999 and before June
24, 2003) and the prospective rules of Regulation section 1.752-7 (appli-
cable to assumptions of liabilities occurring on or after June 24, 2003).
Significantly, the retroactive regulations do not purport to define section 752
liabilities under prior law; they merely require a reduction in outside basis
when a partnership assumes a liability (as defined in section 358(h)(3)) of a
partner that was not otherwise taken into account under section 752.'09 The
new definition of section 752 liabilities (restating the policy-based definition
advanced in Revenue Ruling 1988-77) applies only prospectively."'
In fact, the retroactive regulations are fully consistent with the plain lan-
guage, the legislative history, and the purpose of section 309 of the CRTRA.
By its terms, section 309 authorizes retroactive regulations "to prevent the
acceleration or duplication of losses through the assumption of... liabilities
described in section 358(h)(3) . . . in transactions involving partnerships.""'I
Notwithstanding this language, taxpayers have argued that the directive is
limited to an assumption of liabilities by a corporation of which a partnership
is a shareholder. Although section 358, of course, is a corporate provision, the
definition of liabilities in section 358(h)(3) to include "any fixed or contin-
gent obligation to make payment" is not confined to corporate transactions;
0 8See Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554 (Appendix G),
309, 114 Stat. 2763A-587, 2763A-638 (2000). The taxpayers' arguments echo criticisms
that initially surfaced in public hearings held on October 14, 2003. Witnesses testifying on
behalf of the Coalition Against Regulatory Excesses (CARE) argued that the Congressional
directive should apply only to settings in which a partnership is a transferor-shareholder in a
section 358(h) assumption. See Witnesses Criticize Temporary Regs at IRS Hearing, According to
Unofficial Transcript, 2003 TAx NOTES TODAY 200-37 (Oct. 16, 2003) (reporting statements by
Thomas L. Evans of Kirkland & Ellis LLP, and Professor Philip E Postlewaite of Northwestern
University School of Law); see also Postlewaite, supra note 102, at 21. Under this restrictive
interpretation, no basis reduction would be required when a partnership assumed a partner's
contingent liability as described in Notice 2000-44. Of course, the issue concerning the scope
of the Congressional directive would be moot if, under prior law, section 752 liabilities (like
section 358 liabilities) already included both fixed and contingent obligations.
'
0 9See Reg. § 1.752-6(a). If the liability was already taken into account for purposes of
section 752, the retroactive regulations do not affect adjustments to outside basis, which are
instead governed by the normal rules of section 752.
"'See Reg. § 1.752-1(a)(4).
.'Section 309 directs the Treasury to prescribe rules which provide "appropriate adjust-
ments under subchapter K... to prevent the acceleration or duplication of losses through the
assumption of (or transfer of assets subject to) liabilities described in section 358(h)(3) . . . in
transactions involving partnerships." Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-554 (Appendix G), § 309(c)(1), 114 Stat. 2763A-587, 2763A-638 (2000).
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indeed, it serves admirably as a general definition for all business entities.
Moreover, nothing in the legislative history suggests that Congress intended
to limit the retroactive regulations to transactions between a corporation and
a partnership.'1 2 The obvious purpose of the directive is to harmonize the
liability-assumption rules for corporations and partnerships. To conclude
that Congress intended the retroactive regulations not to apply to abusive
partner-partnership transactions involving contingent liabilities, one would
have to make the unwarranted assumption that Congress was either unaware
of such transactions or was unconcerned about them.
In enacting section 358(h), Congress was well aware of the proliferation
of tax shelters involving assumption of liabilities by partnerships analogous
to those in the corporate context. Nevertheless, it was not clear that applying
the immediate basis-reduction approach of section 358(h) was appropriate
for a pass-through system. In the context of the two-level corporate tax, sec-
tion 358(h) eliminated the built-in loss in the transferor-shareholder's stock
basis but did not deprive the transferee corporation of an otherwise allowable
deduction upon accrual or payment of the contingent obligation. In contrast,
reducing a transferor-partner's outside basis could potentially eliminate even
a single deduction. Since a partner is not permitted to deduct losses in excess
of outside basis, a reduction in outside basis might prevent any partner from
deducting a real economic loss upon accrual or payment of the contingent
11 2In amending the tax-avoidance provision of section 357(b) in 1999, Congress was clearly
aware of analogous problems in the partnership setting. See H.R REP. No. 106-289, at 538
(1999) (Conf. Rep.) (directing the Treasury to "promptly examine the use of partnerships
and apply similar rules (for example, with respect to adjustments to the basis of a partnership
interest with respect to certain contingent liabilities) where there is a principal purpose of
avoiding Federal income tax through the use of a transaction that includes the assumption of
liabilities by a partnership"). Following a veto of the 1999 legislation, Congress adopted the
section 358(h) approach to ensure a basis reduction for contingent liabilities not otherwise
taken into account under section 358. See Jackel & Blanchard, supra note 54, at 1595; see
also Jerred G. Blanchard, Jr. & Kenneth L. Hooker, Fixing Assumption of Liability Rules: The
Wrong Way and the Right Way, 85 Tax Notes 933 (Nov. 15, 1999); STAFF OF J. COMM. ON
TAX'N, Io6TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAx LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE Io6TH
CONGRESS 153 n. 174 (Comm. Print 2001). The Coltec decision eventually resolved any linger-
ing uncertainty about whether, prior to the enactment of section 358(h), contingent liabilities
already constituted liabilities for purposes of section 358. Hence, section 358(h)(3) arguably
merely codified the prior law that section 358 liabilities-and presumably section 752 liabili-
ties as well-included both fixed and contingent liabilities.
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 62, No. 1
SECTION OF TAXATION
liability. "1 3
'The drafters of the section 752 regulations recognized the need to mod-
ify the section 358(h) approach in the partnership context. To preserve
passthrough of a single economic loss while preventing acceleration of losses,
the prospective section 752 regulations generally defer an outside basis reduc-
tion as long as possible when a partnership assumes a "non-§752 liability." ' 14
This approach seeks to preserve, as far as possible, parity between inside and
outside basis. In contrast, the retroactive regulations were aimed at abusive
transactions identified in Notice 2000-44 and generally required an immedi-
ate reduction in outside basis by analogy to the basis-reduction rule of sec-
tion 358. To mitigate the potential harshness of this approach, however, the
retroactive regulations allowed taxpayers to elect the wait-and-see approach
for obligations assumed prior to the effective date of the prospective regula-
tions. Thus, taxpayers could elect to reduce outside basis immediately or on
a deferred basis; what they could not do was completely ignore the required
reduction in outside basis, as Messrs. Daugerdas and Kornman sought to
do.
T-he retroactive regulations generally exempt a bona fide assumption of
liabilities from the remedial basis-reduction rules. In enacting section 358(h),
Congress provided two statutory safe harbors which apply "[e]xcept as
provided by the Secretary."' 15 The discretion to override the safe harbors
reflected concern that the new rules might be subject to manipulation in
unexpected ways. Section 358(h)(2)(A) provides a safe harbor when liabilities
are assumed together with a transfer of the associated business. As a result,
so-called deductible liabilities that are not treated as liabilities for purposes of
""See Reg. § 1.752-6(c), Example. As the example illustrates, the basis reduction gives rise
to a disparity between inside and outside basis; inside basis will be reduced when (and if) the
contingent liability is eventually paid, but the partner to whom the deduction is allocated
may have insufficient outside basis to absorb the deduction. See I.R.C. § 704(d) (suspending
losses in excess of outside basis). Thus, an immediate basis reduction has a harsher effect in
the partnership setting than in the corporate setting. In some permutations of the offsetting-
option shelter, the transferor-partner separated from the shelter prior to expiration or termina-
tion of the paired options and claimed a capital loss on sale of a partnership interest with an
artificially-enhanced basis; the immediate basis reduction mechanically eliminated the artificial
loss on sale of the interest.
114 For an excellent discussion of the rationale of the deferred basis adjustment, see Jackel
& Blanchard, supra note 54. Under the final regulations, the deferred basis adjustment is trig-
gered upon a sale or liquidation of the transferor-partner's partnership interest or an assump-
tion of a non-section 752 liability by a partner other than the transferor-partner. See Reg.
§ 1.752-7(d)-(g). The final regulations recognize that it is these "separation events" (rather
than the initial assumption) that give rise to potential abuse; under prior law, there were no
mechanical rules to ensure that a liability that escaped classification as a section 752 liability
would automatically be taken into account upon a separation event. Thus, the final regulations
distinguish between a section 752 liability for which a basis reduction is required under the
normal rules when the liability is assumed from a partner, and a non-section 752 liability for
which a basis reduction is not required until a separation event.
"
5 1.R.C. § 358(h)(2).
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section 358 remain subject to the general rule of section 357(c). 116 Such favor-
able treatment is denied, however, for a "naked" transfer of liabilities separate
from the underlying business that generated the liabilities. 1 7 Section 358(h)
(2)(B) provides a second safe harbor when liabilities are assumed together
with substantially all the assets associated with those liabilities. To prevent
abuse, the Treasury exercised its authority to limit the second safe harbor both
retroactively and prospectively." I In promulgating final regulations in 2005,
the Treasury reiterated its position that the retroactive regulations apply to
"transactions that are abusive in nature and that lack a business purpose. ' 119
In challenging the validity of the retroactive regulations, taxpayers have
advanced various arguments, some of them hovering on the borderline
between the creative and the frivolous. For example, in one case involving an
offsetting-option shelter, the taxpayers argued that the retroactive regulations
went beyond the Congressional directive to prevent "acceleration or duplica-
tion" of losses and reached transactions that create a "single" artificial loss. 120
Unfortunately, they neglected to point out that the transaction did in fact
result in duplication of loss-once at the partnership level when the options
"16While the legislative history of section 357(c)'s predecessor provision clearly spells out
this requirement, the taxpayers in Black & Decker and Coltec claimed that the literal require-
ments of the statute were satisfied when contingent liabilities were stripped from the under-
lying business and transferred separately to a shell subsidiary. See generally Karen C. Burke,
Deconstructing Black & Decker ' Contingent Liability Shelter: A Statutory Analysis, 108 TAx
NoTs 211 (July 11, 2005) (tracing legislative history).
117This restriction was needed to prevent taxpayers from replicating the abuses involved in
Black & Decker and Coltec. Although Coltec applied the economic substance doctrine to elimi-
nate the claimed tax losses, there would have been no need for section 358(h) if courts had
interpreted section 357(c)(3) to apply only if an assumption of liabilities was coupled with a
transfer of the associated business. See Karen C. Burke, Black & Decker in the Fourth Circuit:
Tax Shelters and Textualism, 111 TAx NOTE-S 315 (Apr. 17, 2006).
1"For example, a transfer of cash generated by a sold option, together with the obligation
under the option, might fall within the safe harbor. To prevent this result, the retroactive regu-
lations deny this exception for transactions identified in Notice 2000-44. The Treasury has also
determined that removing the exception under section 358(h)(2)(B) is necessary to prevent
abuse in transactions involving corporations and shareholders. See T.D. 9397, 2008-22 I.R.B.
385; Reg. § 1.358-5.119T.D. 9207, 2005-1 C.B. 1344, 1346 (preamble); see id. at 1347 (extending the time to
elect the wait-and-see approach in lieu of an immediate basis reduction).
12°In Sala v. United States, 552 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (D. Colo. 2008), the court found the
retroactive regulations invalid as applied to an offsetting-option shelter because the transac-
tion resulted in "a single loss that occur[red] at a specific time: liquidation of the inflated-
basis assets." Id. at 1200. The "single loss" notion is developed at length in an article by two
practitioners whose views were cited by the court. See James Whitmire & Bruce Lemons,
The Partnership Temporary Regulations-Placing a Premium on Validity, 101 TAX NOTES 635,
640-42 (Nov. 3, 2003); see also id, at 642 (portraying regulations that prevent taxpayers from
claiming "a tax loss that is unassociated with an economic loss" as a threat to "the checks and
balances of our constitutional system").
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expired and again on sale of the inflated-basis property. 2 1 Similarly, attempts
to confine the scope of the Congressional directive to transactions involving
liabilities transferred by partnerships to corporations contradict the plain lan-
guage of the directive and undermine its evident purpose. 122 A more insidious
line of argument suggests that contingent-liability shelters would have with-
stood scrutiny under prior law had the retroactive regulations not abruptly
changed the prevailing understanding of section 752 liabilities reflected in
Helmer.123 This line of argument misrepresents the state of prior law by ignor-
ing the Service's policy-based definition of section 752 liabilities as well as the
partnership anti-abuse rule and the longstanding doctrine of economic sub-
stance. 124 Moreover, it distracts attention from the scope of the Congressional
directive and portrays the retroactive regulations as an unprincipled attempt
by the government to bolster its litigating position. 125
Ironically, perhaps the strongest argument against the retroactive regula-
tions is that they were redundant because the abusive transactions in question
were already covered either by section 752 or by the partnership anti-abuse
rule. 26 Although a robust application of section 752 arguably should have
made it unnecessary to rely on the retroactive regulations, the courts have
experienced considerable difficulty in arriving at a sensible and consistent
"'Congress directed the Treasury to issue regulations preventing acceleration or duplication
of loss. The taxpayers' argument is apparently that the transferor-partner's artificial loss on
sale of the partnership interest is not "accelerated" if the loss would not otherwise be allow-
able; and, moreover, that it is not "duplicated" because, in the offsetting-option transaction,
the transferee-partnership will recognize gain (and offsetting loss) when the options expire.
See Whitmire & Lemons, supra note 120, at 642; cf. Postlewaite, supra note 102, at 26 n.27
("Without the duplication of loss, the need for the regulation is questionable.").
122 This argument, however, appears to have resonated with a few lower courts. See Klamath
Strategic Investment Fund, LLC v. United States, 440 E Supp. 2d 608, 622 (E.D. Tex. 2006)
(interpreting directive as contemplating "rules applicable to partnerships that were shareholders
in corporations that engaged in transactions subject to Section 358(h)"); Sala, 552 F. Supp. 2d
at 1200-01 (holding that Congress "only authorized the Treasury to issue regulations involving
transactions between a corporation and a partnership").
23 One court apparently believed that the retroactive regulations adopted a definition of
section 752 liabilities that "change[d] settled law." Klamath, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 620. Although
the preamble to the regulations correctly observes that "tihere [was] no statutory or regu-
latory definition of liabilities for purposes of section 752" under pre-2 003 law, T.D. 9062,
2003-2 C.B. 46, it requires a considerable leap of logic to conclude, as the Klamath court did,
that Helmer and its progeny furnished "the only definition available to taxpayers" under pre-
2003 law. Klamath, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 625. See also Sala, 552 F. Supp. 2d at 1202 ("Treasury
Regulation § 1.752-6 not only alters settled prior law... it directly contradicts the underlying
statutes-26 U.S.C. §§ 358 and 752-the abuse of which it supposedly prevents.").
12 4 See Klamath, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 620 (asserting that the government "knew it was chang-
ing the law regarding 'liabilities' under Section 752 with this new regulation" and sought "to
bar, retroactively, the transactions engaged in by [taxpayers]").
'
25 See id. at 625 (inferring that the regulations were promulgated "to buttress the govern-
ment litigation position").
'
26See Postlewaite, supra note 102, at 19 (arguing that the retroactive regulations were
unnecessary in light of "[tihe shields of Section 752 and/or the anti-abuse regulation," which
"should have been the preferred solutions of choice").
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definition of section 752 liabilities. As a practical matter, the retroactive
regulations provide a useful and effective backstop. Moreover, although the
anti-abuse rule probably should have been sufficient to prevent transactions
described in Notice 2000-44 from occurring in the first place, it clearly was
not. Perhaps shelter counsel, who seem prone to wishful thinking on so
many matters, convinced themselves that the anti-abuse rule itself would be
declared invalid. 127
To the extent that courts are reluctant to apply the retroactive section 752
regulations or the partnership anti-abuse rule, the government may be forced
to litigate tax shelters one case at a time, demonstrating that each mutation
of the same basic transaction lacks economic substance. 12 Even if the gov-
ernment ultimately prevails on the issue of economic substance, an equally
important issue is whether investors in defective tax shelters can rely on opin-
ions issued by shelter counsel to shield them from penalties. At least one
district court found that, although a transaction lacked economic substance,
taxpayers nevertheless avoided all accuracy-related penalties because they
relied in "good faith" on opinions of shelter counsel and had "reasonable
cause" for their reporting position.129 Other courts have been less eager to
treat penalty-shield opinions as a grant of unqualified immunity for transac-
127 See WLLIAM S. McKEE ET AL., supra note 59, 1.0501][c], at 1-21 (suggesting that
failure to litigate the anti-abuse rule in Jade Trading "invokes a strong presumption that the
Service does not believe in the validity of its own regulation" and that, absent judicial enforce-
ment, "taxpayers will eventually recognize the rule for the scarecrow that it is").
"
2
"In Klamath, for example, the government ultimately prevailed on the issue of economic
substance. As a result of the court's earlier partial summary judgment invalidating the retro-
active regulations, however, the government was potentially foreclosed from relitigating the
section 752 issue in eight other shelter cases involving nearly 100 partnerships with the same
tax matters partner.
2 9 1n Klamath, the court eventually agreed that a "premium loan" transaction described
in Notice 2000-44 lacked economic substance based on internal bank records documenting
a secret understanding between the shelter promoter and the lending banks that (1) funds
purportedly available for currency trading would never actually be used for that purpose and
(2) the banks were prepared to apply pressure to ensure that the investment would be termi-
nated promptly. Nevertheless, the court found that the investors (two lawyers who sought to
shelter fees from successful tobacco litigation) had a "reasonable cause" defense to penalties.
See Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, LLC v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 2d 885, 902-905 (E.D.
Tex. 2007); see alo Lee A. Sheppard, What Does IRS BLIPS Victory Mean?," 114 TAx NOTES
617, 621 (Feb. 12, 2007) (noting that the shelter investors were permitted to rely on "tem-
plate opinions . .. that assumed facts and assumed economic substance-what are politely
called factual disconnect opinions"). The court concluded, somewhat incongruously, that the
investors were not aware of the tax benefits until they left the partnership, even though they
obtained several opinions confirming the potential tax benefits.
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tions that plainly lacked economic substance. 130 Faced with a rising tide of tax
shelter litigation involving exotic financial instruments and elaborate fictional
transactions, courts have struggled to understand the nature of the transac-
tions and the applicable legal principles. Allowing investors to hide behind
self-serving opinions of shelter counsel to avoid penalties will only encourage
the proliferation of abusive tax shelters and undermine the sound adminis-
tration of the tax laws. Conversely, the surest way to curb abuse is to deny
penalty-shield protection for transactions that demonstrably lack economic
substance or violate the partnership anti-abuse rule.
VI. Conclusion
T[he rise of contingent-liability shelters has reaffirmed the importance of eco-
nomic substance as a pervasive judicial doctrine and an essential backstop to
the increasingly tangled web of tax statutes and regulations. All too often,
shelter counsel have issued favorable tax opinions concerning transactions
that dearly lacked economic substance, relying on strained logic and tenden-
tious interpretation of governing law. In doing so, they have lost a healthy
sense of skepticism and abandoned professional scruples, putting their own
professional reputations and those of their firms at risk in order to extract
large fees from gullible clients. Designers of tax shelters excel at drawing fine
lines and formalistic distinctions, and they have brought enormous energy
and ingenuity to bear in inventing new variations of the same old basis-shift
transaction. Ultimately, however, the exercise is essentially sterile and destruc-
tive. The experience of Paul Daugerdas and Jenkens & Gilchrist serves as a
reminder that "the ability to perceive alternatives in great number" may be
a "dangerous intelligence unless it is combined with a power to forecast the
likely reaction of the Service and the courts to each of the alternatives in
view."'131 Shelter counsel who, through overconfidence or simple carelessness,
fail to appreciate the limits of legitimate tax planning do a disservice not only
to their clients but also to the rest of the tax bar and the public at large.
130 One court found that a transaction's lack of economic substance trumped reliance on
Helmer as "substantial authority" for purposes of assessing accuracy-related and negligence
penalties at the partnership level. Jade Trading, LLC v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 11, 58 (2007)
("At bottom, the fictional nature of the transaction and its lack of economic reality outweigh
Helmer in the substantial authority assessment.") - In Jade Trading, shelter counsel charged three
taxpayers $100,000 each for substantially identical opinions in connection with an offsetting-
option transaction. Based on the taxpayers' representations that they expected potential profits
from the transaction in excess of costs and expenses, shelter counsel opined that it was "more
likely than not" that neither the economic substance doctrine nor the partnership anti-abuse
rule applied to the transaction. Practitioners have been quick to object to the application of
penalties to taxpayers who "technically complied with the code" and "merely . . . guessed
wrong as to whether the transaction was valid under the economic substance doctrine, an
amorphous and vague common-law standard." Thomas A. Cullinan & Julie P. Bowling, This
One Left Us Jaded, 118 TAx NOTES 422 (Jan. 21, 2008).
3 Marvin A. Chirelstein, Learned Hand's Contribution to the Law of Tax Avoidance, 77 YALiE
L.J. 440, 440 (1968).
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Ironically, the excesses of tax shelter designers have helped to reinvigorate
the economic substance doctrine, as courts search for ways to cut through
contrived transactions and artificial tax losses. 132 Congress and the Treasury
also have a role to play. Detailed provisions like section 358(h) and the retro-
active section 752 regulations can block off specific abuses by plugging gaps
in the existing statute and regulations, but they inevitably lag behind the
capacity of shelter designers to discover new gaps and invent fresh variations.
Moreover, targeted technical remedies may prove counterproductive. With
each new amendment, the basic rules concerning transfers of encumbered
property to and from partnerships (and corporations) become more tangled,
complex, and unwieldy, providing new grist for the tax shelter mills.
The decisions in Cemco and Kornman demonstrate that courts need not
stand by helplessly when confronted with abusive shelters.133 If further rein-
forcement is necessary to protect investors and deter peddlers of defective
shelters, perhaps Congress should consider a more flexible, broad-gauged
approach. The partnership anti-abuse rule has been on the books since 1994
but has not yet been tested in litigation. 34 Any lingering doubt about the
validity of the anti-abuse rule could easily be removed by codifying it, pre-
sumably with retroactive effect to the effective date of the existing regula-
tions. 135 In the meantime, the surge of lawsuits by disappointed investors
who paid large fees for defective shelters is likely to continue unabated. Mr.
Daugerdas and Jenkens & Gilchrist may be the most spectacular casualties of
132See David P. Hariton, When and How Should the Economic Substance Doctrine Be Applied?,
60 TAX L. REv. 29, 56 (2006) (defending economic substance doctrine as an antidote to "tax
shelter promoters who ignore the obvious intent of the law" and courts that "encourage tax-
shelter promoters by applying the literal words of a statute without regard to their underlying
intent").
133See Bankman, Tax Shelter Problem, supra note 3, at 932 ("At the present ... the market
for individual shelters is in disarray, and this condition seems likely to hold for at least the near
future."); Canellos, supra note 4, at 65 ("[T]ax shelters fail regularly in court.... Once a judge
sees the transaction as a shelter,.., the result is predictable-taxpayer loses.").
11The anti-abuse rule explicitly requires a weighing of business purpose against the purported
tax benefits. See Reg. § 1.701-2(a)(1); Karen C. Burke, Tax Avoidance as A Legitimate Business
Purpose, 118 TAx NOTES 1393 (Mar. 11, 2008); cf. Countryside Ltd. P'ship v. Commissioner,
95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1006, 2008 T.C.M. (RIA) 2008-003 (purporting to apply the anti-abuse
rule but failing to consider whether the partnership's business purpose was substantial relative
to the purported tax benefits).
135 1n constructing and selling offsetting-option and short-sale shelters, promoters blithely
ignored the New York State Bar Association's conclusion that these transactions violated the
anti-abuse rule. See supra note 103; see also Reg. § 1.701-2(d), Ex. 8 (illustrating abusive dupli-
cation of basis in the absence of a section 754 election). The anti-abuse rule, though much
criticized, sets forth a concept of abuse that avoids the twin perils of open-ended judicial
doctrines and "arbitrary, mechanical rules." Alan Gunn, The Use and Misuse ofAntiabuse Rules:
Lessons from the Partnership Antiabuse Regulations, 54 S.M.U. L. REv. 159, 176 (2001); see
id. at 174 ("[T] he regulations perform a useful service by setting forth the notion of abuse as
something distinct in principle from substance-over-form and business purpose.").
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the tax shelter wars to date, but they are unlikely to be the last. 136
36 Several promoters and shelter counsel (including Mr. Daugerdas and Jenkens & Gilchrist)
have been the targets of criminal investigations involving allegations of fraudulent concealment
and other activities, but those allegations do not depend on the technical merits of the Son-
of-BOSS shelters. Unfortunately, the Klamath decision invalidating the retroactive section 752
regulations has generated widespread confusion concerning the stakes-both civil and crimi-
nal-in the contingent-liability shelter cases. Cf. Kristin E. Hickman, OfLenitf Chevron, and
KPMG, 26 VA. TAx REv. 905, 928-29 (2007) ("[I1f one accepts the Klamath court's holding
that the government abused its discretion" in issuing the retroactive regulations, and "if taxpay-
ers manage to prevail on economic substance and other issues, then liability-whether crimi-
nal or civil-rests on how a court evaluates the meaning of liabilities under section 752.").
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